ProactiveSecurityRoadmap
1848
Comment: notes about stack smash protections
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1917
updated cron status
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MartinPitt: daemon needs to run as group {{{crontab}}}, {{{/var/spool/cron/crontabs}}} needs to become owned by {{{cron}}} rather than root, a new setuid wrapper program is required which executes the relevant portion of {{{do_command.c/child_process()}}} as root | MartinPitt: Parsing the crontabs as normal user and introducing a minimal setuid wrapper for actually executing the commands as the target user will not help to improve security; the remaining stuff (timer and signal handling) does not accept user input and thus is not very error prone. I do not really have a good idea about this. |
People
Goal
Proactively improve security for Breezy
Requirements
- Run cron as non-root?
- Run dhclient3 as non-root?
- Run dhcpd3 as non-root?
Change unix_chkpwd from suid root to sgid shadow (see [http://bugs.debian.org/155583 #155583])
- Eliminate inetd from base
- Compile-time stack protection?
- Non-executable stack for i386?
Some info already compiled http://ubuntu.com/wiki/UbuntuHardened
Agenda
Pre-Work
- Research privilege requirements of cron
MartinPitt: Parsing the crontabs as normal user and introducing a minimal setuid wrapper for actually executing the commands as the target user will not help to improve security; the remaining stuff (timer and signal handling) does not accept user input and thus is not very error prone. I do not really have a good idea about this.
- Research privilege requirements of dhclient3
MartinPitt: normal user with CAP_NET_RAW and CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE; needs a suid wrapper to call /etc/dhcp3/dhclient-script; prototypical package available; pending security review of dhclient-script (proper quoting, etc.)
- Research privilege requirements of dhcpd3
MartinPitt: normal user with CAP_NET_RAW and CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE for initialization phase; can be dropped after socket creation; prototypical package available
- Search for implicit dependencies on inetd via netbase
- Determine requirements for compile-time stack protection in gcc (4.x?)
MartinPitt: mudflap comes with gcc 4.0, but does not help in any way to improve proactive security; [http://www.research.ibm.com/trl/projects/security/ssp/ SSP] currently offers the [http://www.ida.liu.se/~johwi/research_publications/paper_ndss2003_john_wilander.pdf most effective protection], but does not (currently) work with 4.0 and is unlikely to be accepted upstream
UbuntuDownUnder/BOFs/ProactiveSecurityRoadmap (last edited 2008-08-06 16:18:54 by localhost)